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For most commentators and pollsters, Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election
came as a sharp surprise. Charles Tien and Michael S. Lewis-Beck examine how political science
modelers performed in their election predictions compared to poll aggregators and to the national
polls. When looking at Hillary Clinton’s share of the two-party vote, they ﬁnd that political science
models were the most accurate in their forecasts. The national polls, by contrast, were largely
outside of the margin of error in their predictions for both Clinton and Donald Trump’s share of the
popular vote.
The 2016 US election forecasting ﬁeld was mostly divided up between the political science
modelers, pollsters and poll aggregators. Pollsters and poll aggregators use national and state-level
vote intention polls to make their forecasts, and are continually updating their forecasts until
Election Day. The political science modelers apply theory and evidence from the voting and
elections literature to make their forecasts months before Election Day. How did each approach
perform in 2016, and what does that tell us about the polling versus modeling methods?
First, we evaluate how the political science models fared in trying to forecast Hillary Clinton’s share of the two-party
vote, now standing at 51 percent (as of December 2, 2016).  Overall, they did quite well.  Taking as a base the
forecasts issued by modelers at the annual American Political Science Association meeting, we observe that seven
of eleven were under one percentage point oﬀ. See Table 1, which draws on the forecasts made in the October
issue of PS: Political Science and Politics.  An additional three forecasts were less than two-and-a-half points away. 
Really, just one could be considered something of an outlier, with an error over three points.  By way of contrast to
all of these, the forecast from our Political Economy model appears to have called it exactly right, at 51 percentage
points.
Each political science model can also be evaluated based on its standard error of the estimate (SEE), which gives
an expected, or average, error of the model. The smaller the SEE, the more accurate the model, and if the 2016
case falls within the SEE then the model was accurate for this election. In eight of the ten models that reported an
SEE, the 2016 election error was smaller than the model’s average error. For example, our Political Economy
forecast model reported a standard error of estimate of 2.84, and the 2016 forecast had no error in its prediction.
Overall, the performance of the political science modelers’ forecasts is remarkable.
The accuracy becomes more remarkable when the distance in days from the election itself receives consideration. 
Looking again at Table 1, we see the median lead value was 78 days, a long time before the November 8 election
date, when most poll aggregators were rolling out their ﬁnal guesses.
Table 1 – Forecasts from Political Science Models
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Edit
Forecasters Model(s)
Predicted Two-
Party Popular
Vote for Clinton
Certainty of
Popular
Vote
Plurality
Standard
Error of
Estimate
Days
Before
Election
Error from
51.0% of
two-party
vote
Michael Lewis-Beck and
Charles Tien. Political Economy
51.00% 83% 2.84 74 0
James Campbell. Convention
Bump and Economy
51.20% 75% 1.84 74 -0.2
James Campbell. Trial Heat and
Economy
50.70% 69% 1.67 60 0.3
Brad Lockerbie. Economic
Expectations and Political
Punishment
50.40% 62% 2.78
(MAE)
133 0.6
Christopher Wlezien and Robert
Erikson. LEI and Polls. Pre-
Conventions
51.80% 72% 2.86 148 -0.8
Bruno Jerôme and Veronique
Jerôme-Speziari. State-by-State
Political Economy
50.10% 50% 4.64 121 0.9
Christopher Wlezien and Robert
Erikson. LEI and the Polls.
Post-Conventions
52.00% 82% 2.03 78 -1
Thomas Holbrook. National
Conditions and Trial Heat
52.50% 81% 2.19
(MAE)
61 -1.5
Andreas Graefe, J. Scott
Amstrong, Randall Jones, and
Alfred Cuzan. Pollyvote
52.70% 1.65
(MAE)
63 -1.7
Alan Abramowitz. Time for a
Change
48.60% 66% 1.74 102 2.4
Helmut Norpoth. The Primary
Model
47.50% 87% 246 3.5
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How the poll aggregators performed
Now, how did the poll aggregators do in forecasting the 2016 election outcome?  Taking a look at the Electoral
College vote forecasts, as listed by Upshot on their New York Times website, each had Clinton as having a 70
percent or better chance.  These eﬀorts, all based on state and national polls, were wide of the mark.  Indeed, the
venerable Princeton Election Consortium was wildly oﬀ, giving Clinton a 99 percent certainty of victory.
The poll aggregators that predicted the popular vote share of the total vote did not fare as badly as the Electoral
College predictions. The Upshot had Clinton winning the national popular vote with 45.4 percent to Trump’s 42.3
percent and Libertarian candidate Gary Johnson’s ﬁve percent. FiveThirtyEight’s ﬁnal update on November 8 in the
polls-only forecast showed Clinton with 48.5 percent, Trump with 44.9 percent and Johnson with ﬁve percent, and
Green Party candidate Jill Stein with 1.6 percent of the popular vote (their polls-plus forecast was virtually identical).
The average of the election eve polls as reported on RealClearPolitics had Clinton leading in the four-way race 45.4
percent to 42.2 percent (Trump), to 4.7 percent (Johnson), and 1.9 percent (Stein).
Table 2 reports the forecasting errors of the popular vote forecasts for Clinton and Trump. The prediction error for
Clinton’s share of the popular vote was 2.7 percent in The Upshot and RealClearPolitics, and only 0.4 percent in
FiveThirtyEight.  The forecast errors for Trump, however, were larger in The Upshot and RealClearPolitics (3.9 and
4.0 percent). As these forecasts are based on aggregated polls, the size of these errors can be better understood by
scrutinizing some of the individual polls on the eve of the election.
Table 2 – Accuracy of Poll Aggregators’ Forecasts of Popular Vote
Edit
 Clinton Trump
(prediction & error from 48.1% actual
vote)
(prediction & error from 46.2% actual
vote)
New York Times
Upshot
45.4%, 2.7% 42.3%, 3.9%
FiveThirtyEight 48.5%, -0.4% 44.9%, 1.3%
RealClearPolitics
average
45.4, 2.7% 42.2%, 4.0%
How the national polls performed
How wrong were the individual national polls for the 2016 presidential election? To answer this question, we
evaluate ten national likely voter surveys taken in the month of November as reported in RealClearPolitics.  To help
assess the error of each poll, we take as a standard its reported margin of error (MoE) at the 95 percent conﬁdence
interval. Then, we decide that, if the real vote for Clinton or Trump fell within that margin, the poll had an acceptable
level of accuracy.
Results in Table 3 show that Clinton’s popular vote percentage (48.1 percent) was inside the poll’s margin of error in
only three of the ten likely voter polls conducted in November. Table 4 shows that Trump’s vote percentage (46.2
percent) was inside the margin of error in only four of the ten ﬁnal polls. Given how much attention is paid to polls in
American elections, having accurate polls is a necessity. However, Tables 3 and 4 show that if election eve polls are
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any indication of overall poll accuracy, then there is signiﬁcant room for improvement.
Table 3- Accuracy of Election Eve Polls for Clinton Prediction
Edit
Poll MoE
Clinton
Poll
Clinton
Poll error
ABC/Wash Post Tracking +/-
2.5
47 *
FOX News +/-
2.5
48 *
Monmouth +/-
3.6
50 *
CBS News +/-
3.0
45 0.1
Bloomberg +/-
3.5
44 0.6
Rasmussen Reports +/-
2.5
45 0.6
McClatchy/Marist +/-
3.2
44 0.9
NBC News/Wall St. Jrnl +/-
2.7
44 1.4
IBD/TIPP Tracking +/-
3.1
43 2
Reuters/Ipsos +/-
2.3
42 3.8
* = Actual percent of total vote as of 12/2/2016 (48.1 Clinton, 46.2 Trump) is
within the poll's margin of error.
Table 4 – Accuracy of Election Eve Polls for Trump Prediction
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Poll MoE
Trump
Poll
Trump Poll
error
FOX News +/-
2.5
44 *
IBD/TIPP Tracking +/-
3.1
45 *
McClatchy/Marist +/-
3.2
43 *
Monmouth +/-
3.6
44 *
ABC/Wash Post Tracking +/-
2.5
43 0.7
Rasmussen Reports +/-
2.5
43 0.7
Bloomberg +/-
3.5
41 1.7
CBS News +/-
3.0
41 2.2
NBC News/Wall St. Jrnl +/-
2.7
40 3.5
Reuters/Ipsos +/-
2.3
39 4.9
* = Actual percent of total vote as of 12/2/2016 (48.1 Clinton, 46.2 Trump) is
within the poll's margin of error.
Furthermore, this pattern of errors works against the increasingly widespread conclusion that the polls, after all,
functioned as they should.  As Sean Trende of Real Clear Politics put it, “The story of 2016 is not one of poll failure.”
Our results suggest otherwise, especially when coupled with the aggregated poll estimates across the entire
electoral cycle, which virtually always put Clinton ahead; see, for example, the Real Clear Politics Four-Way
National Poll Average from July 1, 2015 to November 3, 2016.  This consistent pro-Clinton outcome, from a very
large number of samples, indicates systematic bias in the polling (i.e., imagine the textbook example where we
attempt to estimate a population parameter via a repeated number of large random samples, in order to evaluate
the desirable properties of the estimator).   It is hard to resist the implication that some fundamental mistakes are
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occurring at the level of sampling design and execution.  Future forecasts based entirely on polls need to be highly
attentive to their methodologies, and transparent in their explanations and predictions, in order to secure public trust
in their validity.
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